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This Article examines the difficulties inherent in the
confirmation of out-of-state arbitration awards under the
Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act. The author recommends
that either the General Assembly amend the Act to provide
expressly for such confirmations in Maryland courts, or the
courts, in the absence of such legislation, nevertheless
should allow confirmation of such awards.
I. INTRODUCTION
The high cost and time consuming nature of court litigation
have made the arbitration clause' an increasingly prevalent
provision in commercial contracts and have made arbitrations
between citizens of different states more common. 2 Under the
Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, 3 a party may have an arbitra-
tion award reduced to judgment by petitioning a court to confirm the
award. 4 The Act, however, does not expressly proscribe or allow
confirmation of out-of-state awards. Suppose, for example, a
Pennsylvania seller and a Maryland buyer have placed an
arbitration clause in their contract or purchase order. Further
imagine that following a dispute between these parties and after the
appropriate hearing, an arbitration award is made in Pennsylvania
t B.A., 1969, Brooklyn College, CUNY; J.D., 1972, George Washington University;
LL.M., 1975, Harvard Law School; Partner, Melnicove, Kaufman & Weiner, P.A.,
Baltimore, Maryland; Member, Maryland and District of Columbia Bars.
1. A standard arbitration clause as suggested by the Commercial Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association provides:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association,
and judgment upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may be
entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.
2. See generally Comisky & Comisky, Commercial Arbitration - Panacea or
Nightmare, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 457 (1974). Arbitration agreements were regarded at
common law as revocable. This revocability has been changed by legislation. See
Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration - International and Interstate Aspects, 43
YALE L.J. 716 (1934). For a Maryland case supporting the common law
revocability doctrine, but holding that the doctrine has been statutorily
abrogated, see Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md.
App. 307, 320 A.2d 558 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526
(1975).
3. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§3-201 to -234 (1974).
4. Id. §3-227. Jurisdiction is limited to "a court of equity." Id. §3-201(b).
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in favor of the Pennsylvania seller. Will the Pennsylvania seller be
able to enforce his award in Maryland by petitioning the Maryland
court to confirm the award? The answer, undisclosed by the
statutory language, is explored in this article.
II. BACKGROUND: GENERAL ENFORCEMENT
OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Although the Federal Arbitration Act5 governs agreements to
arbitrate where the contract evidences a transaction in interstate
commerce, 6 a federal court may nonetheless not have jurisdiction. In
such event, the jurisdiction of a state court will have to be invoked. A
federal court may lack jurisdiction because a party seeking
enforcement of an arbitration agreement must have an independent
basis of federal jurisdiction, separate from the arbitration agreement
and the Federal Arbitration Act. 7 In the example above, where
jurisdiction would depend upon diversity, jurisdiction would be
lacking were the contract amount to fail to exceed the $10,000
jurisdictional amount requirement.8
Confronted by an absence of jurisdiction in the federal court, our
hypothetical Pennsylvania seller would be forced to resort to a state
court to enforce the award. He may, however, find that he is barred
in the state court as well. The Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act
provides:
An agreement providing for arbitration under the law of the
state confers jurisdiction on a court to enforce the agreement
and enter judgment on an arbitration award.9
If the agreement in our hypothetical provided that it were governed
by Maryland law, then the section would clearly apply. On the other
hand, if the agreement were to be governed by Pennsylvania law, or
any other state's law, the applicability of the above provision would
become questionable. But then the seller may be precluded from
petitioning any court in Maryland to enforce the arbitration
agreement. Could a state court tolerate such a result? The answer is
probably, "no."
The current language in the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act
is derived from older language in the Maryland Code. 10 Previously,
Maryland courts had jurisdiction to enforce arbitration awards only
if the agreement provided for arbitration "in this state."" The
5. 9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1976).
6. Id. §2.
7. Id. § 4. Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Const. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976) (specifically).
9. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-202 (1974) (emphasis added).




present language gives Maryland courts jurisdiction if the agree-
ment provides for arbitration "under the law of the state."12 This
may actually be a further restriction on jurisdiction in Maryland. It
may even mean that Maryland courts do not have jurisdiction to
enforce arbitration awards unless the contract specifies that in the
event of arbitration, Maryland law will control. Yet, given the
Federal Arbitration Act's seal of statutory approval of arbitration,
the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts, 13 and the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution,14 a Maryland court would
most likely enforce the agreement in our hypothetical. 15
As long ago as 1837, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
acknowledged that "submissions to award . . . by agreement
without suit, are familiar to the law since its earliest history."1
6
However, in Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors,
Inc., the court of special appeals held that executory agreements for
arbitration are not enforceable at common law. 17 Perhaps, therefore,
there can be no enforcement of the arbitration outside of the
arbitration statute in Maryland.
III. CONFIRMATION OF THE ARBITRATION AWARD
Further hypothesize that the Maryland buyer, dissatisfied with
the goods shipped, instituted action in Maryland against the
Pennsylvania seller. The seller, in response, filed a petition to
enforce the arbitration agreement. After the Maryland court ordered
arbitration, which took place in Pennsylvania,1 8 an award was
entered in favor of the Pennsylvania seller, who now seeks to
convert his award to judgment in Maryland. The Maryland Uniform
Arbitration Act provides that "[a] party may petition the court to
confirm the award, . . . [t]he court shall confirm the award .
12. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-202 (1974).
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause as used in the text, should be
distinguished from the federal preemption doctrine. Under the former, where
state and federal substantive policies conflict, the Federal Arbitration Act may
govern a dispute in interstate commerce preempting potential applicability of a
conflicting or nonconflicting state act. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350
U.S. 198 (1950).
15. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-501 (1974). Powles v. Dilley, 9 Gill 222
(Md. 1850); Bank of United States v. Merchants Bank of Baltimore, 7 Gill 415
(Md. 1848).
16. Shriver v. Maryland, 9 G. & J. 1, 11 (Md. 1837).
17. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 320
A.2d 558 (1974).
18. The situs of the arbitration is determined by the place specified in the agreement
of the parties. If no place is stated, the arbitrator may choose the place under the
Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Flower World of America, Inc. v.
Whittington, 39 Md. App. 187, 194, 385 A.2d 85, 89 (1978).
19. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-227 (1974).
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and "[i]f an order confirming . .. an award is granted, a judgment
shall be entered in conformity with the order. The judgment may be
enforced as any other judgment."20 From this language, it would
appear that the Pennsylvania award holder can simply petition the
Maryland court to confirm the award and enter judgment. But can
he? The following discussion examines the viability of this conclu-
sion.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA
At this point, we are no longer dealing with invoking a
Maryland court's jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement,
but rather the Pennsylvania seller is simply asking the court to
confirm the out-of-state arbitration award. There is no common law
prohibition against this type of suit. As has been previously
mentioned, the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act neither explicitly
proscribes nor permits confirmation of awards rendered in other
states. The pertinent language of the Act provides:
Confirmation of award by court.
(a) Petition. - A party may petition the court to confirm
the award.
(b) Action by court. - The court shall confirm the award,
unless the other party has filed an application to
vacate, modify, or correct the award within the time
provided in §§ 3-223 and 3-224.
(c) Proceedings when award not confirmed. - If an
application to vacate, modify or correct the award has
been filed, the court shall proceed as provided in
§§ 3-223 and 3-224.21
Two states have adopted statutory provisions explicitly authoriz-
ing the confirmation of out-of-state awards. The first state was
Michigan;22 the second was California.23 Michigan's provision
provides that "a court of competent jurisdiction may confirm an
arbitration award rendered in another state and enter judgment
thereon.'24 California's provision states that "if a petition . . . is
duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made,
whether rendered in this state or another state."
25
20. Id. § 3-228.
21. Id. at § 3-227. See also Md. Rule E2 (providing for conformation of awards
rendered pursuant to agreements to arbitrate to which the Maryland Act "is
inapplicable").
22. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §600.5033 (Supp. 1978).
23. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286 (Supp. 1978).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. See note 23 supra.
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It is possible to surmise that the Michigan and California
Legislatures were reacting to a line of New York cases, 26 which held
that an award obtained outside the state could not be reduced to
judgment in the forum state by confirmation of the award in the
absence of specific statutory authority. A distinction must be drawn
between enforcement of an out-of-state award by a common law
action for judgment on the award, and a statutory mechanism to
confirm the award and then reduce it to judgment. The former has
often been allowed as an ordinary common law action.27 It is the
latter procedure which the New York cases refused to follow when
presented with an out-of-state award. Unfortunately, the reasoning
of these cases falters upon close analysis.
V. THE JUDICIAL ARENA
In the first of the New York cases, In re California Packing
Corp.,28 the petitioner filed an application for an order that
arbitration take place in California, pursuant to an agreement
between the parties. The court refused to compel the respondent to
arbitrate in California, "for the reason that no award taken without
the state may be the basis of a judgment. ' 29 This holding is at odds
with a recent Court of Special Appeals of Maryland decision, which
held that a court may compel arbitration outside of the state in
accordance with the parties' agreement °
In United Artists' Corp. v. Gottesman,31 a petition to confirm a
Massachusetts award in New York was denied "[iun view of the
decision of Skandinaviska Granit Aktiebolaget v. Weiss."'32 No other
reason for the denial was given. One would assume that the
Skandinaviska case held that an out-of-state award could not be
confirmed and entered as a judgment within the state. A more
detailed and precise analysis of the Skandinaviska decision,
33
however, reveals that the court was not dealing with the issue of
confirmation of an out-of-state award as presented to the Gottesman
26. See notes 28, 31, 32, 38 & 40 and accompanying text infra.
27. Edmundson v. Wilson, 108 Ala. 118, 19 So. 367 (1896); Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255
N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931); Taylor v. Basye, 119 Wash. 263, 205 P. 16 (1922).
But see Wright Graham & Co. v. Hammond, 41 Ga. App. 738, 154 S.E. 649 (1930);
Sanford Laundry v. Simon, 285 N.Y. 488, 35 N.E.2d 182 (1941) (if the contract
provides solely for statutory enforcement, then action on award is not allowed).
28. 121 Misc. 212, 201 N.Y.S. 158 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
29. Id.
30. Flower World of America, Inc. v. Whittington, 39 Md. App. 187, 194, 385 A.2d 85,
89 (1978).
31. 135 Misc. 92, 236 N.Y.S. 623 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
32. Id. at 93, 236 N.Y.S. at 624.
33. 226 A.D. 56, 234 N.Y.S. 202 (1929).
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court. In Skandinaviska, the defendant, a New York resident, agreed
to arbitration in Sweden. The Swedish award and judgment were
held not to be enforceable in New York because the defendant was
not personally served with notice of the proceedings in Sweden
sufficient to comport with due process requirements. 34 The Skandina-
viska case, therefore, can only be read to hold that foreign awards or
judgments, improperly obtained in the jurisdictional sense, will not
be confirmed by the forum state.35 Whether a court will only examine
an award to make sure that proper jurisdiction was established in
the award rendering state, as with judgments of sister states under
the full faith and credit clause, 36 is uncertain, because technically
"[t]he award after all is not a judgment, and not entitled to full faith
and credit.
'37
The Gottesman court's reliance on Skandinaviska was un-
founded. A similar error occurred in United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers v. General Electric Co., 38 in which the New York
court stated that it was without power to enter a judgment upon an
award rendered in a Massachusetts arbitration, and as authority for
its ruling it relied on California Packing Corp. It will be recalled that
the California Packing Corp. court reasoned that it could not enforce
an agreement to arbitrate in another state because the out-of-state
award could not serve as the basis for a judgment within the state.
The enforcement of such an agreement, however, has been held
appropriate in Maryland. 39
The point for discussion is that the California Packing Corp.
court refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in another state.
The rationale for the court's refusal was that an out-of-state award
could not serve as a basis for a subsequent judgment within the
forum state. That rationale, however, rests on a false premise
because a court can enforce an agreement notwithstanding the
parties' agreement to arbitrate the matter in another state. In
Landerton Co. v. Public Service Heat & Power Co.,40 for example, the
parties agreed to a Connecticut arbitration. The arbitrator suggested
that a more convenient locale for him would be New York because
34. Id. at 60, 234 N.Y.S. at 207.
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §220 (1971); Lorenzen,
Commercial Arbitration - Enforcement of Foreign Awards, 45 YALE L.J. 39
(1935).
36. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (to make a sister state's
judgment a judgment in another state, the sister must have jurisdiction).
37. Stanger, Interstate Enforcement of Arbitration Awards and Judgments, 8 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 559 (1959).
38. 193 Misc. 146, 83 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1948), aff'd, 275 A.D. 908, 90 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1949).
39. Flower World of America, Inc. v. Whittington, 39 Md. App. 187, 385 A.2d 85
(1978).
40. 118 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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that was where his office was located. The parties agreed to have the
arbitration held in New York, but concomitantly agreed that Con-
necticut was was to have continuing jurisdiction. Because of this
agreement, the New York court refused to confirm the award and
stated that, as the parties agreed, it should have been confirmed in
Connecticut.
41
As has been shown, none of the cases intimating that a court
cannot confirm an out-of-state award provides a sound rationale for
such a prohibition. If these were the only cases that shed any light
on the issue, one could conclude that the language of the Maryland
Uniform Arbitration Act impliedly proscribes confirmation of out-of-
state awards by failing explicitly to prescribe it. Michigan and
California seemingly felt compelled to legislate on the matter given
the existence of the New York cases as the sole judicial authority at
that time. There exists, however, judicial authority more recent than
the line of New York cases discussed above, on the basis of which
one could conclude that confirmation of an out-of-state award under
the Maryland Act is allowed.
Before discussing this judicial authority, the question arises
whether the inability to confirm directly an out-of-state award
actually poses serious difficulties for the award holder. The award
holder could probably confirm the award and reduce it to a judgment
in the award rendering state, and then seek to register the judgment
in the sister state as a matter of full faith and credit.42 The dilemma,
however, is that the award holder must take at least one extra
procedural step, and it will require more time and may also be more
expensive because of the requirement of retaining both local and out-
of-state attorneys. In addition, to register a sister state's judgment in
the circuit court for many Maryland counties, one must file a
Declaration with a Motion for Summary Judgment giving the
defendant notice and an opportunity to respond. This makes the
procedure even more cumbersome and costly. In point of fact, such a
multi-stepped procedure is counterproductive to the very purpose of
arbitration - a speedy, informal, and inexpensive resolution of the
dispute. Direct confirmation of out-of-state awards by a one-step
procedure is thus much more desirable.
Recognizing the desirability of a reduction to judgment of an
out-of-state award, some courts have approved it. Despite the line of
New York cases to the contrary, a more recent New York case
departs from those cases. In Swan v. Sit'N Chat Restaurant, Inc., 43
the court held that an out-of-state New Jersey award could be
41. Id. at 86.
42. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-701 to -709 (1974).
43. 43 A.D.2d 949, 352 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1974).
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confirmed in New York, where the agreement between the parties
provided for New Jersey arbitration in accordance with the
American Federation of Musicians Bylaws under which confirma-
tion of the award could be made in New York. The departure from
the previous line of cases is a slight one, if at all, because the case is
distinguishable from its predecessors. By implicitly adopting the
American Federation of Musicians Bylaws, the parties agreed in
effect that the award, although obtained in New Jersey, could be
confirmed in New York. Thus, the court was merely effectuating the
contractual intent of the parties. Nevertheless, at least to the extent
that the parties so agree, the case stands for the proposition that an
out-of-state award could be confirmed by the court.
It is well established that parties can consent ahead of time to
the personal jurisdiction of a particular tribunal. The Supreme Court
in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent declared that
"parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the
jurisdiction of a given court."44 Consequently, the Second Circuit in
In re Reed & Martin, Inc. held that parties to a contract can consent
not only to arbitration but also to having a judgment upon an
arbitration award in one state entered in any other state court.45 At
least when the parties so intended, a court otherwise reluctant to
confirm an out-of-state award under the language of the Maryland
Uniform Arbitration Act should have its reluctance dispelled.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL OVERTONES
To resolve any doubts, the Maryland General Assembly, like the
legislatures in Michigan and California, should amend the Mary-
land Uniform Arbitration Act expressly to allow confirmation of out-
of-state arbitration awards. Even in the face of legislative inaction,
the Maryland courts should sanction such a course, the dictum and
judicial gloss in the New York cases to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. Arguably, simple confirmation of out-of-state awards is
mandated constitutionally. State action that impedes the efficient
flow of commerce between the states could be in violation of the
commerce clause.46 Refusing to allow direct confirmation of out-of-
state awards may discourage an otherwise willing merchant, when
the contract amount is relatively small, from proceeding with the
interstate transaction because he knows that a dispute may lead to a
costly resolution procedure. A speedy and economical enforcement
process will promote interstate commercial activities.
44. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964). It is in
personam jurisdiction that the court addresses. A party can neither confer nor
divest a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Either it exists, or doesn't exist.
45. In re Reed & Martin, Inc., 439 F,2d 1268, 1276 (2d Cir. 1971).




Confirming an out-of-state award directly is tantamount to
according the arbitration award rendered in a sister state full faith
and credit as if it were a judgment. There is no good reason why a
sister state's award should be accorded any less recognition than a
judgment. A judgment, jurisdictionally or constitutionally invalid
where rendered, will not be recognized. An award, similarly invalid,
will also not be recognized. There is some authority, however,
suggesting that a sister state's award ought to be treated differently.
In Benton v. Singleton,4 7 pursuant to voluntary arbitration between
the parties, an award was made in a dispute over an agreement to
speculate in cotton futures. The award holder sought to enforce his
award in a sister state where it was regarded as a gambling debt
contrary to the forum's public policy. The court refused to accord the
award recognition, stating that an "award rendered in a sister state
is not to be regarded as having the sanctity of a judgment of that
character. ' 48 The rationale for the pronouncement was never
adequately explained, leaving the implication that arbitrators do not
stand on equal footing with judges, and therefore their decisions
ought not have as much force. The point is that the parties
voluntarily chose the arbitral forum, and as long as the arbitrator
had competent jurisdiction and due process notice requirements were
fulfilled, the award should stand on an equal footing with a
judgment. The courts have already stated that arbitration awards
should be confirmed absent fraud or mistake. As was stated by one
commentator:
An arbitration award rendered in accordance with a modern
statute is considered by the rendering state a final
determination of the controversy. Reduction to judgment is
only a formalistic device to ensure enforcement through
judicial processes if necessary. It would seem therefore, that
the validity of the award should be determined by the law of
the rendering state and that the award should be accorded
as much finality as the judicial machinery of the enforcing
state for reducing the award to judgment permits.
49
Although there are cases to the contrary, 50 it has been long
established that a sister state's judgment must be enforced as a
47. 114 Ga. 548, 40 S.E. 811 (1902).
48. Id. at 557, 40 S.E. at 815. Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the court's
argument that an award can be accorded less recognition than a judgment, the
question could then arise whether, if such award was made after court ordered
arbitration, the award was a c ilmination of "judicial proceedings" within the
meaning of the full faith and credit clause, necessitating full recognition.
49. Note, Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 902,
914 (1956).
50. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161, 168 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), aff'd,'453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1971).
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matter of full faith and credit, even though to do so would violate the
forum's public policy.51 As long ago as 1833 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that if an award can be mechanically reduced to
judgment in a sister state, then such judgment is entitled to full faith
and credit.
5 2
Assuming the forum state can confirm the out-of-state award,
either because of a statutory mechanism for its confirmation, or
because it is deemed otherwise appropriate, the forum court ought
not regard the award as necessitating any greater scrutiny - or
judicial review - than an out-of-state judgment.5 3
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the extensive movement of commerce across the state
boundaries, in instances when the parties have resolved to arbitrate
their disputes, an award should be accorded the same status
irrespective of where it was rendered. Whether the award was made
within the confines of the forum state, or outside its geographical
boundaries, should be of no significance to the court whose
jurisdiction is invoked to confirm the award. As long as the court
has proper in personam jurisdiction, and as long as the award could
not be challenged for invalidity in the award rendering state, the
award should be confirmed5s The arbitration process would thus be
well served, yet within the framework of the judicial process.
51. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1947); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237
(1908); Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 126, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (1975).
52. Wernwag v. Pawling, 5 G. & J. 500, 507 (Md. 1833).
53. Another state's judgment confirming an award should be enforceable qua
judgment. The award should be viewed as merged into the judgment. But see
Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1973).
54. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
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